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Abstract
We present an undecidability result for the veriﬁcation of security protocols. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is
unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties, several recent works relax this assumption, allowing the
intruder to exploit these properties.We are interested in theAbelian groups theory in combinationwith the homomorphism axiom.We
show that the security problem for a bounded number of sessions (expressed by satisﬁability of symbolic deductibility constraints) is
undecidable, obtaining in this way the ﬁrst undecidability result concerning a theory for which uniﬁcation is known to be decidable
[F. Baader, Uniﬁcation in commutative theories, Hilbert’s basis theorem, and Gröbner bases, J. ACM 40(3) (1993) 477–503].
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are small programs designed to ensure secure communication via a public channel. Many
works have been devoted to the use of formal methods in order to automate the proof of the absence of logical attacks
on such protocols (e.g. [6]).
The problem of decidingwhether a protocol is secure or not is known to be undecidable in general, even under several
restrictions [1,4,12]. An interesting decidability result has been obtained by Rusinowitch and Turuani [15], under the
assumption that the number of sessions (i.e. the number of parallel role instances) is bounded. This pioneer work relies
on the so-called perfect cryptography assumption, which states that the cryptographic primitives (encryption, hashing,
. . .) are perfect and can be treated as black boxes.
Since then, a recent research direction consists in relaxing this assumption by taking into account algebraic properties
such as exclusive or, Abelian groups. . . . Several decision procedures, relying on the constraint solving approach, have
been proposed (e.g. [6]). It is well known that the equational theories we can hope to handle are those for which
uniﬁcation is decidable. It is also well-admitted that this restriction is not sufﬁcient although, as far as we know, no
counterexample has been exhibited.
In this paper, we study the equational theory AGh, i.e. the Abelian groups theory (AG) in combination with the
axiom (h): h(x + y) = h(x) + h(y), whose uniﬁcation problem is known to be decidable [2]. We prove that the
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security problem for a bounded number of sessions is undecidable. The question of the decidability of the protocol
security problem in that case is interesting since some protocols relies on these algebraic properties. A well-known
example is the TMN protocol [16] on which an attack, due to Simmons, makes use of the homomorphic property
of RSA encryption: {x × y}pub(S) = {x}pub(S) × {y}pub(S). Such a protocol, in which RSA encryption is only used
with the public key of the server, can be modeled in our settings assuming that the decryption key of the server is a
trusted key.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic deﬁnitions
We use classical notation and terminology on terms (see [10] for details). We write T (F,X ) for the set of terms
built over the ﬁnite (ranked) alphabet F of function symbols and the set X of variables. T (F,∅) is also written as
T (F). The set F is partitioned into a subset PF of private functions symbols, and a subset VF of visible or public
functions symbols and we assume that VF contains classical symbols such as pairing 〈., .〉, encryption {.}. and some
others such as 0, h(.), −. and . + . related to the equational theory studied in this paper. The set of variables occurring
in t is noted vars(t).
A substitution  is a mapping from a ﬁnite subset of X , called its domain and written as dom(), to T (F,X ).
Substitutions are extended to endomorphisms of T (F,X ) as usual. We use a postﬁx notation for their application. If
E is a set of equations (unordered pair of terms), we note sig(E) for the set of function symbols occurring in E and by
=E the least congruence on T (F,X ) such that u =E v for all pairs u = v ∈ E and substitutions . An E-context is a
-term x1, . . . , xn.t with t ∈ T (sig(E), {x1, . . . , xn}), also written as t[x1, . . . , xn]. The application of t[x1, . . . , xn]
to arguments u1, . . . , un is written as t[u1, . . . , un].
A term rewriting system is a ﬁnite set of rewrite rules l → r where l ∈ T (F,X ) and r ∈ T (F, vars(l)). Given
a term rewriting system R and a set of equations E, the relation →R/E (rewriting modulo E) is deﬁned as follows:
s →R/E t if and only if s =E u[l]p and u[r]p =E t , for some context u, position p in u, rule l → r ∈ R, and
substitution . We denote by ∗−→R/E the reﬂexive and transitive closure of →R/E. A rewrite system R/E is said to
be E-convergent if there is no inﬁnite chains t1 →R/E t2 →R/E . . . and for every three terms t , s1 and s2 such
that t →R/E s1 and t →R/E s2, there exists a term s such that s1 ∗−→R/E s and s2 ∗−→R/E s. A term t is in normal form
(w.r.t. →R/E) if there is no term s such that t →R/E s. If t ∗−→R/E s and s is in normal form then we say that s is a
normal form of t .
2.2. Dolev–Yao model extended with an equational theory
The most widely used deduction relation representing the deduction abilities of an intruder is often referred to as the
Dolev–Yao model [11]. In addition, we give to the intruder the power to use equational reasoning modulo a set E of
equational axioms (see Fig. 1).
The intended meaning of a sequent T  u is that the intruder is able to deduce the term u ∈ T (F) from the ﬁnite
set of terms T ⊆ T (F). As in the standard Dolev–Yao model, the intruder can compose new terms (C) from known
Fig. 1. Inference system IDY+E.
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terms, he can also decompose pairs (UL,UR) and decrypt ciphertexts, providing that he can deduce the decryption key
(D). Finally, we relax the perfect cryptography assumption through the rule (Eq) allowing the intruder to exploit the
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives.
Deﬁnition 1 (I-proof). Let I be an inference system. An I-proof P of T  u is a tree such that:
• the root of P is labeled by T  u,
• every leaf of P labeled by T  v is such that v ∈ T ,
• for every node labeled by T  v having n sons labeled by T  v1, . . . , T  vn, there is an instance of an inference
rule of I with conclusion T  v and hypotheses T  v1, . . . , T  vn such that side conditions are satisﬁed.
2.3. Equational theory AGh
In this paper, we focus on the theoryAGh, i.e. the homomorphism axiom (h), h(x+y) = h(x)+h(y), in combination
with the theory AG (Abelian groups):
• Associativity & Commutativity (AC): x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z, x + y = y + x,
• Unit (U) & Inverse (Inv): x + 0 = x, x + −(x) = 0.
We represent the AGh equational theory by an AC-convergent rewrite system. This can be obtained by orienting from
left to right the equations (U), (Inv), (h) and by adding the following consequences:
h(0) → 0 −(−x) → x −0 → 0
h(−x) → −(h(x)) −(x + y) → −(x) + −(y)
In the remainder of the paper, we always assume that terms are kept in normal form (w.r.t. →).
Example 2. Let T = {a + h(a),−h(h(a)) + b}. The proof tree below is an IDY+AGh-proof of T h(a) + b.
T  a + h(a)
(C)
T  h(a + h(a)) T  − h(h(a)) + b
(C)
T  h(a + h(a)) + −h(h(a)) + b
(Eq)
T  h(a) + b
A term t is standard if it is not of the form f (t1, . . . , tn) with f ∈ sig(E).
Deﬁnition 3 (Factors). Let t be a term (in normal form), t =AC C[t1, . . . , tn] for some standard terms t1, . . . , tn
(in normal forms) and an E-context C. The set FactE(t) of factors of t is deﬁned by FactE(t) = {t1, . . . , tn}.
Note that, since the term rewriting system considered is AC-convergent, the set FactE(t) is uniquely determined up
to associativity and commutativity of +. For example, let t1 = h2(a) + b + c and t2 = h(〈a, b〉) + c. The terms t1
and t2 are not standard. We have FactE(t1) = {a, b, c} and FactE(t2) = {〈a, b〉, c}.
Let n ∈ N. The notation hn(t) (resp. nt) represents the term t (resp. 0) if n = 0, and h(hn−1(t)) (resp. t + (n − 1)t)
otherwise. Lastly, −nt represents the term n(−t). A polynomial P(h) ∈ Z[h] can be written as ∑ni=0 cihi where
ci ∈ Z. The product 	 of a polynomial by a term is a term deﬁned as follows:
(
n∑
i=0
bihi
)
	 t =
n∑
i=0
bihi (t).
Conversely a ground term t such that FactE(t) = {f1, . . . , fn} can be written as pf1 	 f1 + · · · + pfn 	 fn for some
pf1 , . . . , pfn ∈ Z[h].
Deﬁnition 4 (Number of occurrences). Let t be a ground term and f a ground standard term. The number of occur-
rences of f in t , denoted by N (f, t), is 0 if f /∈ FactE(t) and pf (0) otherwise.
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Note that an occurrence of a constant c under a symbol h in a term t plays no role in N (c, t). For instance, let
p = (3h2 +−2) and t = a + 2b. We have: p 	 t = 3h2(a + 2b)+−2(a + 2b) = (3h2 +−2)	 a + (6h2 +−4)	 b.
Hence N (a, p 	 t) = −2 and N (b, p 	 t) = −4.
3. Constraints solving
3.1. Security via constraint solving
In our setting, logical attacks can be characterized by sequences of abstract messages exchanged by honest agents
executing the protocol, and by the intruder. Since we consider a bounded number of sessions, there is only a bounded
number of symbolic traces. The idea of the algorithm is to guess a symbolic trace in which the messages are represented
by terms containing variables. This symbolic trace corresponds to a concrete execution trace if the variables can be
instantiated in such a way that, at every moment, a message received by an agent can be deduced by the intruder
from the messages seen before. Hence, verifying security of a protocol amounts to a non-deterministic guessing of the
symbolic trace plus the resolution of a system of symbolic deductibility constraints.
More explanations about how to construct the symbolic constraint system from a given protocol can be found
in [5,13].
3.2. Deductibility constraint system
Deﬁnition 5 (Deductibility constraint). A deductibility constraint is an expression of the form T  u where T is a
ﬁnite subset of T (F,X ), and u ∈ T (F,X ). A system of constraints is a sequence of constraints. Given an inference
system I, a solution to a constraint system C is a substitution  such that for every T  u ∈ C, there exists an I-proof
of T   u.
Deﬁnition 6 (Well-deﬁned). A constraint system C = {T1  u1, . . . , Tn  un} is well-deﬁned if:
(1) for all i < n, Ti ⊆ Ti+1,
(2) for all substitution , C satisﬁes the following requirement:
∀in, ∀x ∈ vars(Ti), ∃j < i such that x ∈ vars(uj).
This notion of well deﬁnedness is due to Millen and Shmatikov. In [13], they show that “reasonable’’ protocols, in
which legitimate protocol participants only execute deterministic steps (up to the generation of random nonces) always
lead to a well-deﬁned constraint system.
Theorem 7. The problem of deciding whether a well-deﬁned constraint system has a solution in IDY+AGh is undecid-
able.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the proof of this result. In fact, the DY part of the intruder model plays no
role in this undecidability result. More precisely, the encoding proposed in Section 4 works both in IDY+AGh and in
the inference system made up of (Eq) and (C) where VF = {0,+, h,−}. In [8], it is formally shown that for constraint
systems involving no function symbols outside sig(E) (as the one built in our encoding), undecidability in the latter
inference system implies undecidability in IDY+AGh.
4. Undecidability for AGh
We use the following formulation of Hilbert’s 10th problem, known to be undecidable [7]. Note that we can simulate
the product by using the identity (u + v)2 = u2 + v2 + 2uv.
INPUT: a ﬁnite set S of Diophantine equations where each equation is of the form: xi = m, xi +xi′ = xj , or x2i = xj .
OUTPUT: does S have a solution over Z?
Given an instance S of Hilbert’s 10th problem with n free variables, we built a well-deﬁned constraint system C(S),
such that S has a solution (v1, . . . , vn) over Z if and only if C(S) has a solution in IDY+AGh.
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We choose to encode an integer v in a ground term t by N (a, t) (see Deﬁnition 4). Our encoding is made up of two
parts. The ﬁrst one (Section 4.1) is independent of the equations of S. This part is used to introduce our term variables
and to ensure some relationships between them after their instantiation by , a solution of C(S) (see Lemma 9). In the
second part of our encoding (Section 4.2), we deal with the equations of S: each one is encoded by a deductibility
constraint.
4.1. Encoding product
Let p (resp. n) be the number of equations (resp. variables) in S. We describe below how we build the ﬁrst partA(n)
of our constraint system. For every i = 1, . . . , n, the constraint system A(n) contains the following ﬁve deductibility
constraints whose free variables are Xi, Yi , and Zi :
hp+n+2(a)  hp+n+2(Xi) (1)
hp+n+2(a)  hp+n+2(Zi) (1)
hp+n+1(b), hp+n+2(a)  hp+n+1(Yi) (1)
hp+n(a + b), hp+n+1(b), hp+n+2(a)  hp+n(Xi + Yi) (2)
hp+n−i (Xi + b), . . . , hp+n−2(X2 + b), . . . , hp+n−1(X1 + b),
hp+n(a + b), hp+n+1(b), hp+n+2(a)  hp+n−i (Zi + Yi) (3)
Let A1(n) (resp. A2(n), A3(n)) be the constraint system which is made up of the constraints of type 1 (resp. 2, 3).
The idea of our encoding is ﬁrst to ensure that if  is a solution toA(n), the terms Xi and Zi contain no occurrence
of b, and the terms Yi contain no occurrence of a. This is ensured by the deductibility constraints of type 1. Then,
thanks to the constraints of type 2, we ensure that N (a,Xi) = N (b, Yi). Lastly, the constraints of type 3 allows
us to encode the products. Note that, each time, only the last term introduced on the left-hand side of the deductibility
constraint is relevant to build the target term. Indeed only the terms of the form hk′(. . . ) with k′k are relevant to
build a term of the form hk(t). The terms hk′(. . . ) with k′ > k have no impact: they cannot contribute to N (c, t) for
any constant c.
Example 8. We illustrate the ﬁrst part of our construction with n = 3. We gather together constraints of the same type.
A1(3) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
h8(a)  h8(X1) h8(a)  h8(Z1) h7(b), h8(a)  h7(Y1)
h8(a)  h8(X2) h8(a)  h8(Z2) h7(b), h8(a)  h7(Y2)
h8(a)  h8(X3) h8(a)  h8(Z3) h7(b), h8(a)  h7(Y3)
A2(3) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h6(X1 + Y1)
h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h6(X2 + Y2)
h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h6(X3 + Y3)
A3(3) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
h5(X1 + b), h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h5(Z1 + Y1)
h4(X2 + b), h5(X1 + b), h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h4(Z2 + Y2)
h3(X3 + b), h4(x2 + b), h5(X1 + b), h6(a + b), h7(b), h8(a)  h3(Z3 + Y3)
Lemma 9. Let n ∈ N and  a solution to A(n) in IDY+AGh. We have:
(1) for 1 in, N (a,Xi) = N (b, Yi),
(2) for 1 in, N (a, Zi) = N (a,Xi)2.
Proof. Let  be a solution to A(n). Firstly, constraints of type 1 ensure that N (b,Xi) = N (b, Zi) = 0 and
N (a, Yi) = 0. Thanks to the constraints of type 2, we have that N (a,Xi) + N (a, Yi) = N (b,Xi) +
N (b, Yi). Putting these two results together allow us to conclude for (1). Now, we consider the ith constraint of
type 3. This constraint ensures that there exists z ∈ Z such that: z × (N (b,Xi) + 1) = N (b, Yi) + N (b, Zi)
and z × N (a,Xi) = N (a, Yi) + N (a, Zi). Thanks to (1) and the fact that N (b,Xi) = N (b, Zi) = N (a, Yi)
= 0, we conclude for (2). 
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4.2. Encoding equations of S
In this section, we describe the partB(S) of our coding which really depends on S = {e1, . . . , ep}.B(S) contains one
deductibility constraint per equation, denoted by d1, . . . , dp. We let T0 the knowledge that the intruder has obtained at
the end of the ﬁrst part of our coding, i.e.
T0 = {hp+n−j (Xj + b) | 1jn} ∪ {hp+n(a + b), hp+n+1(b), hp+n+2(a)}.
We build the dk’s inductively, depending on the form of ek . The ck’s are constants distinct from 0, a and b. Their role
are just to prevent addition. They ensure that we only use one time the term introduced with this constant to build the
target term of the corresponding deductibility constraint.
• If ek = “xi = m’’ then Tk = Tk−1 ∪ {hp−k(Xi) + ck} and dk = Tk  hp−k(ma) + ck .
• If ek = “xi + xi′ = xj ’’ then Tk = Tk−1 ∪ {hp−k(Xi + Xi′) + ck} and dk = Tk  hp−k(Xj ) + ck .
• If ek = “xi = x2j ’’ then Tk = Tk−1 ∪ {hp−k(Xi) + ck}, dk = Tk  hp−k(Zj ) + ck .
Example 10. Let Se = {x1 = 2, x22 = x3, x2 + x3 = x1}. We obtain
B(Se) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
h2(X1) + c1, T0  h2(2a) + c1
h(X3) + c2, h2(X1) + c1, T0  h(Z2) + c2
X2 + X3 + c3, h(X3) + c2, h2(X1) + c1, T0  h(X1) + c3
Proposition 11. Let S be a set of equations (over n variables) and C(S) be the constraint system A(n) ∪ B(S).
We have:
(1) C(S) is well-deﬁned,
(2) S has a solution over Z ⇔ C(S) has a solution in IDY+AGh.
Proof. (1) The fact that variables have been introduced at the beginning and one by one ensures the well-deﬁnedness
of the constraint system.
(2) (⇒) Let v1, . . . , vn be a solution to S. Let  = {X1 → v1a, . . . , Xn → vna, Y1 → v1b, . . . , Yn → vnb, Z1 →
v21a, . . . , Zn → v2na}, we prove that  is a solution to C(S). To do this, we show that for each constraint T  u ∈ C(S),
there exists an IDY+AGh-proof of T   u. It is easy to show that such proofs exist. Each time we only have to use the
last term introduced in the hypothesis set of the given constraint.
(⇐) Let  be a solution to C(S). Let vi = N (a,Xi). We show that v1, . . . , vn is a solution to S. From Lemma 9,
we have N (a, Zi) = N (a,Xi)2. We have to show that (v1, . . . , vn) is a solution to each equation in S. Let ek be
the kth equation of S. Consider the constraint in B(S) corresponding to this equation. For instance, assume that the
equation is of the form “xi = x2j ’’ (the others cases are similar). Then the constraint is of the form
Tk−1, hp−k(Xi) + ck  hp−k(Zj) + ck.
Note that ck only appears in the term hp−k(Xi) + ck among all the terms in the hypotheses and ck has to appear in
the conclusion. We deduce that N (a,Xi) = N (a, Zj). From Lemma 9, we have N (a, Zj) = N (a,Xj)2 and
we conclude. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, satisﬁability of well-deﬁned constraint systems is shown undecidable for the theory AGh. This result
completes the view of the problem for the three theories ACh (for which uniﬁcation is undecidable [14]), ACUNh
(AGh plus the equation −(x) = x) and AGh. The undecidability result for AGh contrasts with the decidability one
obtained for ACUNh [9]. It would now be interesting to have a complete view of the problem for the three theories AC,
ACUN and AG. Although results for ACUN and AG are known to be decidable [5,3,13], the AC case seems to be very
challenging.
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